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CHALLENGES TO THE LEGALITY OF
MINIBRIDGE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS
Advancing technology has had a profound effect on the maritime
industry, producing such innovations as containerization, lighter
aboard ship (LASH) and roll-on, roll-off (Ro-Ro) ship systems.' Ships
utilizing this technology are larger and faster than conventional
merchant ships and spend hours rather than days in-port transferring
their cargo.' Port terminals have added expensive high-speed cranes,
specially designed to handle containerized cargo, which permit the
rapid on- and off-loading of the ships.3 This modem technology places
a high premium on the close meshing of water, rail and motor carriers
into a single "intermodal" transportation system. Such a system offers
1. The maritime industry has its own vocabulary, and this Note will of necessity use termi-
nology which may not be familiar to the reader. As the terms are introduced, a working definition
will be supplied. "Containerization" of cargo means prepackaging cargo into a rigid steel box,
most often of dimensions approximately 20 x 8 x 8 feet or 40 x 8 x 8 feet, capable of being carried
as a single unit over highway, rail or ocean transport. The Maritime Administration defines a
container as
a new self-contained cargo carrying unit ... normally of rectangular configuration, sus-
ceptible of mechanical handling, for shipping a number of smaller packages or bulk
material, that confines and protects the contents from loss or damage and can be handled
efficiently and economically as a unit by, and in interchange between, the different
modes of transportation ....
46 C.F.R. § 255.2 (1977).
LASH systems include a lighter, or barge, of dimensions 61-1/2 x 31-1/2 x 14 feet with a
cargo capacity of approximately 370 tons. The lighter can act as a self-contained unit and may be
towed individually in inland waters. It is lifted aboard its "mother" ship for ocean transit. A
variant of LASH is the SEABEE system which uses a larger capacity barge. See Port Royal
Marine v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aj'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975), for a
description of the LASH system.
Roll-on, roll-off (Ro-Ro) ship systems involve wheeled cargo which can be driven or rolled
on and off the ship.
2. Modem containerships can carry 1000 to 2000 containers at speeds in excess of 30 knots.
See Crutcher, 7he Ocean Bill of Lading-4 Study in Fossilization, 45 TUL. L. REv. 697, 720
(1971); Schmeltzer & Sheppard, Container Feeder Systems, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 215-216 (1973).
For example, a new class of containership, the SL-7, displaces 51,000 tons when loaded, is 946 feet
long and is capable of 33 knots. See Kopec, Shios of U.S.-Flag IntermodalFleet, 101 U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROCEEDINGs 213 (1975). The containership may enter port, transfer cargo and depart in
one-quarter the time required for a conventional ship to handle the same amount of cargo.
Crutcher, supra, at 721; Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems ofthe Container Revolution,
1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 203, 208 (1970).
3. See Crutcher, supra note 2, at 722; ProposedAmendments to ShipPing Act of 1916 to Pro-
videfor the Establishment of Single-Factor Rates: Hearings on H.. 15465 Before the Subcomn on
Merchant Marine of the House Coma on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 57
(1972) (testimony of Karl-Heinz Sager, as quoted in statement of Manuel Diaz).
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the shipper' great savings in time, greater protection for his goods
through fewer handlings and, in many cases, the promise of direct cost
savings in transporting his goods to foreign markets.5
However, the new technology has also created several major
problems. Chief among these is the question of which agency is to reg-
ulate intermodal transportation of goods from inland points to foreign
destinations. Since such shipments involve overland and water carri-
ers, they are subject to the jurisdiction of both the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC).6
For conventional transportation of break-bulk7 goods, the jurisdic-
tional division between these agencies is marked by well-defined trans-
shipment points, where goods change hands from motor or rail to
ocean carriers. However, these traditional jurisdictional boundaries do
not work as well in the context of intermodal transportation. Freight
moving via a technologically innovative system is loaded only once at
the shipper's plant or at an inland consolidation point.' So packaged,
the container moves as a single unit from an inland area to the port
terminal. Since the cargo is, in effect, prepackaged, and travels in a
single movement, there is no easily drawn jurisdictional line.9
4. Generally, a "shipper" is one who entrusts his goods to a "carrier" for transport to a
desired destination.
5. See Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 2, at 206-10, for a discussion of the advantages of-
fered to the shipper by containerization.
6. See notes 19-22, 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
7. "Break-bulk" is descriptive terminology for cargo which, loaded as single discrete units
aboard a carrier, produces a single load. When the cargo is transshipped from one carrier to
another, the load is broken back into single units, then reloaded onboard the carrier for the next
segment of the cargo's movement.
8. The inland consolidator may be a "freight forwarder," subject to ICC regulation, or a
"non-vessel operating common carrier" (NVOCC), subject to FMC jurisdiction. Each performs
similar services for the shipper by combining less than carload (LCL) cargo into full container
loads and by arranging for transport of the cargo between the shipper and his buyer. The FMC
requires registration of NVOCCs under 49 C.F.R. § 512.20 (1977) since they file tariffs and ar-
range for transport of goods to foreign destinations via ocean carrier. The ICC requires registra-
tion of freight fowarders for similar services in the domestic carriage of goods. Since these
services are so similar and often overlap, they have occasioned many jurisdictional disputes be-
tween the ICC and the FMC. See, e.g., CTI-Container Transp. Int'l, Freight Forwarder Applica-
tion, 341 LC.C. 169 (1972) (ICC held that it has jurisdiction to require ICC permit of FMC-
qualified NVOCCs limited to domestic freight forwarding activities of the NVOCC). But see
I.M.L. Sea Transit, Ltd. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Cal.), a 'd, 409 U.S. 1002 (1972)
(court granted an injunction forbidding ICC from ordering an NVOCC to suspend its operations).
In CTI-Container, the ICC addressed the ZM.L. Sea Transit decision and rejected the district
court's interpretation of the nature of the activities engaged in by the NVOCC. 341 I.C.C. at 186
n.17.
9. Sacramento-Yolo Port Dist., Petition for Declaratory Order, 341 I.C.C. 105 (1972), illus-
trates the difficulty of dividing jurisdiction between the agencies where goods move via intermodal
transport. In that case, the port engaged in the practice of transferring containerized cargo that
had arrived in San Francisco from foreign ports via common ocean carriers to barges which then
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Furthermore, the full benefits of technologically innovative trans-
portation systems can be achieved only by fashioning equally innova-
tive regulatory schemes. The intermodal carrier must be permitted to
present a potential shipper with a "joint through rate" setting forth the
full cost of transport of his goods from their point of origin to their
destination. By simplifying the complex details regarding overland
ICC-regulated rates, port terminal charges, and FMC-regulated ocean
tariffs, such a rate structure allows the shipper to ship confidently under
a single bill of lading and to look to a single carrier for liability for lost
or damaged goods.10
carried the containers to the port of Sacramento, 79 miles inland. The port sought a declaratory
order that ICC jurisdiction should not extend to this inland barge movement, since all of the cargo
was moving from foreign ports to Sacramento under single port-to-port bills of lading naming
Sacramento as the destination.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC's jurisdiction extends to
transportation of. . . property ... wholly by water ... from or to a place in the United
States to or from a place outside the United States,. . . only insofar as such transporta-
tion. . . takes place from any place in the United States to any other place therein prior
to transshipment at a place within the United States from movement to a place outside
thereof ....
49 U.S.C. § 902(i)(3)(B) (1970).
Sacramento-Yolo Port District contended that the movement of containerized cargo via barge
did not constitute "transshipment" under the statute. 341 I.C.C. at 107. Nonetheless, the ICC
asserted jurisdiction over the inland barge portion of the through movement, finding that there
was a sufficient "transshipment" anytime there was a transfer of lading of the cargo (Ie., a change
in the means of carriage). Id. at 110-11.
The limits of the jurisdiction of the two agencies were tested the following year in Port Royal
Marine Corp. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Ga. 1974), a1 7'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). In
that case, LASH barges that had been transported from foreign ports by ocean carriers were dis-
charged at a coastal port and towed by tugboat over domestic waterways to their destinations.
Again, the entire through movement involved only one bill of lading, naming the inland port as
the destination. As in Sacramento-Yolo, the ICC asserted jurisdiction based on the assumption
that the unloading and towing of the barges constituted a "transshipment" within the meaning of
the Interstate Commerce Act. However, the issue ofjurisdiction caused such problems that ajoint
jurisdictional statement regarding LASH operations was issued by the FMC and the ICC:
[T]he transfer of cargoes from one barge to another barge of the same mother vessel, or
another mother vessel of the same carrier or commonly controlled by it shall not be
deemed to constitute transshipment. However, the towage of barges between the United
States ports, when undertaken by other than the ocean carrier, is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Joint Jurisdictional Statement Issued by ICC, FMC on "Lash" Operations (May 12, 1972), quoted
in Sacramento-Yolo, 341 I.C.C. at 112. This negotiated division of jurisdiction was affirmed in
Port Royal Marine, in which the court found Sacramento-Yolo to be appropriate authority for
ICC jurisdiction over the inland barge movement. 378 F. Supp. at 351. Indicative of the continu-
ing controversy between the ICC and the FMC over the limits of their jurisdiction, the PortRoyal
Marine court took notice that in the ICC proceeding below the FMC had asserted that no trans-
shipment occurred and that the ICC was thus without jurisdiction. Id. at 347 n.l. It was this
controversy that the negotiated joint jurisdictional statement was designed to solve.
10. Here again, the use of maritime language must be explained. 46 C.F.R. § 536.16(a)
(1977) offers the following definitions:
(1) Through route: An arrangement for the continuous carriage of goods between
points of origin and destination, either or both of which lie beyond port terminal areas;
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A carrier wishing to file a through rate that will provide a single
cost to the shipper, including overland rate, terminal charges and the
ocean rate, must file a tariff with both the ICC and the FMC. This
tariff must include both the through rate and the underlying rates of the
carriers regulated by each commission. Each underlying rate is then
reviewed by the commission having jurisdiction over that portion of the
intermodal movement under its own standards to determine the rea-
sonableness of the rate.11 Such coordination of FMC and ICC jurisdic-
tion in establishing joint through rates permits. greater participation in
foreign trade by small or inland shippers who, prior to such coordina-
(2) Through rate: A rate expressed as a single number representing the charge to the
shipper by a carrier or carriers holding out to provide transportation over a through
route;
(3) Joint rate: A through rate in which two or more carriers participate by agreement
for the offering of through transportation over a through route published in the same
tariff. ....
See Note, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of the Container Revolution, 57 GEO. L.J. 533, 537-38
(1969) (listing the possibility of lower prices and increased convenience to the shipper as major
advantages of joint through rates); f Matson Navigation Co.-Container Freight Tariffs, 7
F.M.C. 480 (1963) (pick-up and delivery of containerized cargo by ocean carrier deemed "more
efficient and less costly service" to shippers. Id. at 491. The ocean carrier is "charged with direc-
tion of and liability for the services performed." Id.).
11. The allowance of joint filings of a tariff with the ICC and the FMC, which permit the
carrier to construct a through rate structure, is a recent development in regulatory law. Prior to
1970, each agency held that it lacked authority to receive joint filings that would allow a single-
factor through rate to be developed. See text accompanying notes 23-27,66 infra. See Note, supra
note 10, at 539; cf. Note, Coordination ofIntermodal Transportation, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 262
& n.88 (1969) (establishment of through routes and joint rates between FMC- and ICC-regulated
carriers said to be impossible under existing regulatory statutes).
FMC filing requirements for through routes are contained in 46 C.F.R. § 536.16(b) (1977):
Every common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States. . . shall
file with the Commission tariffs of any through rates, charges, rules, and regulations
governing the through transportation of freight between ports or points in the United
States and ports or points in a foreign country in which such carrier or conference partic-
ipates. Such tariffs shall include the names of all participating carriers, the established
through route, a description of the service to be performed by each participating carrier,
and shall clearly indicate the division, rate, or charge that is to be collected by the water
carrier subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, for its port-to-port portion of the through serv-
ice, which division, rate, or charge shall be treated as a proportional rate subject to the
provisions of the Shipping Act, 1916. Such tariffs win be filed and maintained in the
manner provided in section 18(b) of the Shipping Act, 1916, and this part.
The tariff fied with the FMC thus must state the ocean portion of the through rate and include
any inland rates filed with the ICC in arriving at the single-factor through rate. The FMC will
limit its review of the rate to the port-to-port portion of the through rate, treating it as a propor-
tional rate. See 46 C.F.R. § 536.15(d) (1977). A proportional rate means that the rate assessed is
conditioned on a prior or subsequent movement of cargo. 46 C.F.R. § 536.1(0 (1977).
The ICC in Ex Parte 261, In re Tariffs Containing Joint Rates and Through Routes for the
Transportation of Property Between Points in the United States and Points in Foreign Countries,
351 I.C.C. 490 (1976), ajf'dsub nom. Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978), found jurisdiction to accept intermodal through rate tariffs that
included the tariffs of FMC-regulated carriers for the ocean portion of the through route. While
requiring that the ocean rates be stated, the ICC limited its substantive regulation to that portion
of the route involving ICC-regulated carriers. 351 I.C.C. at 491.
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tion, were deterred by the complexity of the international transporta-
tion of goods.
The development of cooperative regulatory mechanisms by which
carriers may offer the advantages of intermodal transportation to ship-
pers has resulted in the emergence of innovative carrier service tech-
niques known as "minibridge" or "land-bridge" operations.' 2
Generally, the ocean carrier will provide a container to one or more
shippers who package it with their cargo. The shippers pay full price
for the transport to the ocean carrier, who then "subcontracts" for mo-
tor or rail transport from the point of origin to the port for ocean trans-
port. The ICC-regulated carrier's rate is paid out of the through rate
paid by the shipper. Likewise, the port terminal charges, ocean transit,
foreign delivery and any other charges may be included in the joint
through rate charged to the shipper. Such a system benefits both the
shipper, who enjoys simplified services, and the ocean carrier, who may
take advantage of lower relative costs of transport by overland or ocean
service to and from a particular area.
While holding great promise of opening foreign markets to the
smaller inland shippers, evolving intermodal minibridge schemes have
stirred intense opposition from port and labor interests. The large capi-
tal investment by carriers and ports occasioned by container technology
has reduced the number of longshoremen jobs both by requiring fewer
handlings of the cargo and by using mechanized loading techniques
that require only a fraction of the conventionally needed personnel.' 3
12. In its simplest form, a minibridge replaces some portion of port-to-port carriage of in-
termodal freight with overland domestic carriage. This allows the shipper to take advantage of
geographic and commercial conditions that favor a partial overland route as opposed to an all-
water route. For example, a minibridge system from Japan to New York was described in Coun-
cil of N. AUt. Shipping Ass'ns (hereinafter cited as Far Eas), No. 73-38 (F.M.C. Aug. 8, 1978)
(Report and Order Adopting Initial Decision) (hereinafter cited as Final Decision):
[Tihe agreed to division takes the form of a water rate and a flat rail rate per container,
the rail carriage being from rail ramp at the West Coast port to rail ramp at New York.
The Kobe shipper takes delivery of the water carrier's container, packs it, and delivers it
to the water carrier's container yard. The water carrier collects the total freight from the
shipper, moves the cargo to the West Coast port (e.g., Long Beach), pays the Long Beach
terminal and wharfage charges, transfers the cargo from the ship to the rail ramp, and
pays the railroad the agreed rate for transcontinental transport. The consignee receives
the container at the New York railhead. Outbound the operation is reversed. The ship-
per, of course, has the free choice between an all-water service or a minibridge service.
Final Decision, slip op. at 2 nA. For a discussion of the Far East case, see text accompanying
notes 74-81 infra.
Another example of minibridge operation is provided in Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518
F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975). The minibridge operator shipped containerized cargo from the midwest
and Texas by rail to Charleston, South Carolina, where it was transshipped for ocean transport to
northern Europe. This system produced savings of time over the alternative all-water route. Id.
at 177.
13. In the Initial Decision of the Far East case, No. 73-38 (F.M.C. July 1, 1977) (hereinafter
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Ports, too, have found the technology a mixed blessing. Fewer port
calls by ships and staging areas away from port terminal areas 14 reduce
the conventional wharfage and docking fees to be collected.' 5 More
significantly, a carrier engaging in an intermodal or minibridge trans-
port scheme prefers to conduct his operations from a single site at
which he can centralize his capital investment. Consequently, cargo is
diverted from other ports to the central location by overland transport,
with the extra cost for the overland transport being absorbed into the
cost charged the shipper for the entire movement to the cargo's foreign
destination. 6 The port from which the cargo is diverted is thus de-
prived of commerce both directly in fees charged to the carrier and
indirectly in employment and business in the surrounding area.
In opposing the development of minibridge and land-bridge sys-
tems, port and labor interests have pursued two avenues of attack.
First, they have challenged the jurisdiction of either the ICC or the
FMC to accept the joint through rates that form the basis for such sys-
tems, since the decision to accept such joint through rates was made by
the commissions without statutory expansion of their jurisdiction. Sec-
ond, port interests have relied upon traditionally recognized causes of
action available under the Shipping Act of 1916.1" The Act provides
that when activities by an ocean carrier result in port discrimination
and diversion of cargo "naturally tributary"'18 to a port, the FMC may
cited as Initial Decision), evidence showed that membership in the International Longshoremen's
Association for the Port of New York had fallen from 21,471 in 1966 to 11,746 in 1974. Initial
Decision, slip op. at 12. This decline was primarily attributed to containerization of the maritime
industry. Id. at 12-13. Labor agreements often require that packaging of containers within 50
miles of a port be accomplished by longshoremen. See Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 2, at 237;
cf. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1968) (labor union's at-
tempts to provide for longshoremen displaced by advanced technology was protested by a ship-
per).
14. Since containers may be packaged and stored away from terminal areas, "staging" (sort-
ing and storing the containers) may occur at inland points. Not until actual loading need the
container be brought to the port area. See Pacific Coast European Conference Rules 10 and 12,
14 F.M.C. 266, 270 (1971) (containerships require special loading facilities).
15. Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 2, at 208, saw savings by the carrier in limiting the
number of ships operating in fewer port calls and in limiting the number of hours in-port at each
port visit. This advantage may be offset by the need to negotiate with the ports to obtain priority
contracts for use of container berths.
16. See, e.g., Intermodal Serv. to Portland, Ore., 17 F.M.C. 106 (1973) (cargo moved over-
land from Portland to Seattle for ocean transport); Stockton Port Dist., 9 F.M.C. 12 (1965), a,Pd,
369 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967) (carriers sought by rate equaliza-
tion practices to avoid direct calls on Stockton, California). See generally Schrneltzer & Sheppard,
supra note 2 (carriers utilizing container systems will attempt to feed containers to a central loca-
tion for foreign transport).
17. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
18. The concept of "naturally tributary" cargo has been derived from the FMC's interpreta-
tion of congressional purposes embodied in four acts: the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-
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grant relief to the disadvantaged port. The FMC's continued adher-
ence to these traditional concepts of port protection in reviewing the
effects of minibridge operations could provide a strong challenge to
their legality.
This Note will review the two lines of attack utilized by opponents
to minibridge or land-bridge schemes, examining first the jurisdictional
basis for coordination between the agencies and then the traditional
causes of action available to the opponents under FMC administrative
precedent. The Note will conclude that neither means of challenge is
likely to succeed. Thus, minibridge schemes will provide shippers with
more efficient access to foreign markets, promising savings of time and,
in some cases, promising reduced costs of transport.
I. THE AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE JURISDICTION
In order to determine whether the ICC and the FMC have the
power to coordinate jurisdiction in accepting joint through rates, it is
first necessary to determine the statutory limits of each agency's juris-
diction. Once this has been done, the authorities can be examined to
see if they lend support to coordination of jurisdiction by recognizing,
perhaps implicitly, the authority of each agency to exercise jurisdiction
over its own portion of a joint through route.
A. ICC Jurisdiction.
The ICC derives its authority from the Interstate Commerce Act. 19
Under section 1(1) of the Act, the ICC is authorized to regulate
transportation ... partly by railroad and partly by water when both
are used under. . . an arrangement for a continuous carriage or
shipment. . . from or to any place in the United States to or from a
foreign country but only insofar as such transportation takes place
within the United States.20
This section, in conjunction with language of the Act granting the
ICC jurisdiction over motor carriers21 and domestic water carriers,22
842 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975); the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
and the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For the
development of the naturally tributary concept, see text accompanying notes 91-114 infra.
19. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-327, 901-923, 1001-1022 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
20. Id. § I(I).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1970) provides:
Common carriers of property by motor vehicle may establish reasonable through
routes and joint rates, charges, and classifications with other such carriers or with com-
mon carriers by railroad and/or express and/or water ... As used in this subsection
the term "common carriers by water" includes water common carriers subject to the
Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, or the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, as amended
(including persons who hold themselves out to transport goods by water but who do not
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strongly supports an assertion of ICC authority over joint through
routes and seems clearly to envision through routes from inland points
of the United States to foreign destinations by rail, motor or water car-
riers. Prior to 1969, however, the ICC maintained that it lacked au-
thority to accept filings of joint through rates for routes that included
carriage aboard FMC-regulated ocean carriers. Its interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Act was based primarily on two early ICC deci-
sions, Cosmopolitan Shdping Co. 23 and Chamber of Commerce of New
York.24
In Cosmopolitan Shioping Co., decided in 1908, the ICC held that
the Interstate Commerce Act did not grant the ICC authority to regu-
late ocean carriers participating with ICC-regulated carriers in a
through route arrangement by which goods were transported from in-
land points of the United States to foreign destinations. Since at that
time there were no statutory controls over ocean carriers' rates, the ICC
found a potential for manipulation of the ocean portion of the through
own or operate vessels) engaged in the transportation of property in interstate or foreign
commerce between Alaska or Hawaii on the one hand, and, on the other, the other States
of the Union, and through routes and joint rates so established and all classifications,
regulations, and practices in connection therewith shall be subject to the provisions of
this chapter.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of common carriers by water to establish reasonable through
routes with other such carriers and with common carriers by railroad, for the transporta-
tion of persons or property, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifica-
tions applicable thereto, and to provide reasonable facilities for operating such through
routes, and to make reasonable rules and regulations with respect to their operation and
providing for reasonable compensation to those entitled thereto. Common carriers by
water may establish reasonable through routes and rates, fares, charges, and classifica-
tions applicable thereto with common carriers by motor vehicle. Common carriers by
water subject to this chapter may also establish reasonable through routes and joint rates,
charges, and classifications with common carriers by water subject to the Shipping Act,
1916, as amended, or the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended (including persons
who hold themselves out to transport goods but who do not own or operate vessels)
engaged in the transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce between
Alaska or Hawaii on the one hand, and, on the other, the other States of the Union, and
such through routes and joint rates, and all classifications, regulations, and practices es-
tablished in connection therewith shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.
The explicit authorization contained in sections 316(e) and 905(b) for the development of through
routes between Alaska and Hawaii and the continental United States was the result of an amend-
ment to the Act, Pub. L. No. 87-595, § 2, 76 Stat. 398 (1962), designed to streamline carriage
between these geographically isolated states. The jurisdiction of the ICC to regulate ocean carri-
ers otherwise regulated by the FMC over such through routes was confirmed in Alaska S.S. Co. v.
FMC, 399 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1968), and Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. FMC, 404 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.
1968). The explicit grant of jurisdiction grew out of congressional realization that lack of regula-
tory coordination unduly hindered transport of cargo from inland point to inland point when the
transport was partially via ocean carriage. See Note, Coordination of Intermodal Transportation,
supra note 11, at 263-68.
23. 13 I.C.C. 266 (1908). Cosmopolitan arose as a complaint against pooling arrangements by
ocean carriers that offered through routes from inland points in the United States to foreign desti-
nations.
24. 24 I.C.C. 55 (1912).
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rate in order to attract traffic via the ICC carrier. Thus, a distinction
was drawn between joint through routes under which goods moved ex-
clusively via ICC-regulated carriers and through routes which included
ocean carriage beyond direct ICC jurisdiction.25 The ICC held that the
former category of through rates was to be allowed, but that " 'joint
rates' cannot be made between carriers subject to the Act and those not
subject to the Act."26 Four years later, in Chamber of Commerce, the
ICC held that inland rail rates must be stated separately and indepen-
dently from ocean rates in any tariff filing for goods traveling in a
through movement from inland United States to foreign ports.27
The Cosmopolitan holding was followed for over fifty years, until
1969. Even prior to 1969, however, several factors emerged which
augured a reversal of the ICC's position on coordination with the
FMC. First, the Shipping Act of 191628 brought greater stability to
ocean rates through federal regulation of ocean carriers. Thus, the pos-
sibility of abuse of joint rates by manipulation of unregulated ocean
portions of a through rate arrangement was lessened.29 Second, the
Transportation Act of 192030 amended section 1(1) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, making the enabling language more capable of an in-
terpretation allowing coordination between domestic and international
carriers. Originally section 1(1) granted the ICC jurisdiction over
transportation "from or to any place in the United States to or from an
adjacent foreign country. ' 31 The 1920 amendment deleted the word
25. 13 I.C.C. at 280.
26. Id.
27. 24 I.C.C. at 74. Chamber of Commerce arose when a group of merchants contested a
railroad's rates for goods moving through New York destined for foreign transport because the
rates were higher than charges for goods moving through other ports on the Atlantic. The ICC
cited Cosmopolitan as authority for denying its power to accept joint through rates for routes that
included international ocean carriage.
28. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970).
29. The Shipping Act required the filing of tariffs by ocean carriers setting out rates charged
for transport and provided for review by the Shipping Board (now the FMC) of the rates for their
reasonableness. Id. § 817.
30. Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
31. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Section I of the Act as enacted
in 1887 provided:
[T]he provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the
transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and
partly by water when both are used, under a common control, management, or arrange-
ment, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United
States. . . to any other State or Territory of the United States. . . or from any place in
the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States
through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the trans-
portation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a
foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or shipped from
a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port
of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country ....
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"adjacent," leaving the language "from or to any place in the United
States to or from a foreign country.
32
Finally, pressure to accommodate the emerging technology in-
creased steadily through the 1960s, 33 manifesting itself most noticeably
in ICC determinations regarding "piggybacking" or "trailer-on-flatcar"
transport.34 This intermodal system uses combinations of ICC-regu-
lated rail and motor carriers in the transport of loaded trailers. Since
the through route does not involve FMC regulation, there is no prob-
lem of coordinating agency jurisdictions.3  However, two Supreme
Court decisions in this area demonstrated the Court's willingness to
interpret the Interstate Commerce Act expansively in order to accom-
modate new transport systems.
In American Trucking Associations v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway,3 6 railroads challenged an ICC ruling that would compel them
to make their piggybacking system available to motor carriers under
the same terms that applied to the railroads themselves. The Supreme
Court found broad authority for the ICC to administer the provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act.3 7 While the Act did not explicitly au-
(Emphasis added).
32. Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, § 400, 41 Stat. 456 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(1) (1970)).
33. See, e.g., Expare 230, Substituted Serv.-Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers
and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Serv.), 322 I.C.C. 301 (1964), set aside sub nom. Atchison, T.
& S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1965), rev'dsub nom. American Trucking
Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967) (reinstating ICC decision). In Expare 230,
the ICC recognized the explosive growth of trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) services. 322 I.C.C. at 305-
07.
34. The ICC defines TOFC service as "the transportation on a rail car, in interstate or foreign
commerce of (a) any freight-laden highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer (or the container portion
of any highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer having a demountable chassis) .... " 49 C.F.R. §
1090.1 (1977).
35. The Interstate Commerce Act explicitly grants jurisdiction to the ICC to receive through
routes that involve rail, motor or water carriers subject to ICC regulation. 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970)
(rail and water through routes recognized); id. § 316(e) (motor carriers may establish through
route and joint rates with rail and/or water carriers); id. § 905(b) (ICC-regulated domestic water
carriers may establish through routes with rail and motor carriers).
36. 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
37. The American Trucking Court stated the issue as:
Does the Interstate Commerce Commission have authority to promulgate rules provid-
ing (1) that railroads which offer trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC or "piggyback") service to the
public under open-tariff publications must make such service available on the same
terms to motor and water common and contract carriers, and (2) that motor and water
carriers may, subject to certain conditions, utilize TOFC facilities in the performance of
their authorized service?
Id. at 399-400.
Traditionally, the ICC's position was that railroads had discretion to grant or to deny motor
carriers access to TOFC service. Id. at 402 (citing Expare 129, Substituted Freight Serv., 232
I.C.C. 683 (1939)); see Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 I.C.C. 93, 105 (1954).
When the ICC reversed its position in Exparne 230, holding that when TOFC service is
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thorize the ICC to compel coordination of carriers, the Court said that
"[t]he very complexities of the subject have necessarily caused Con-
gress to cast its regulatory provisions in general terms. Congress has, in
general, left the contents of these terms to be spelled out in particular
cases by administrative and judicial action .... ,,38
In Canada Packers, Ltd v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway39
the Supreme Court held that the ICC had authority under the Inter-
state Commerce Act to accept joint through rates of rail carriers for
through routes which extended from the inland United States into
Mexico and Canada.' The Court found ample authority to receive
joint through rates for filing, but reserved judgment as to the legality of
substantive review by the ICC of that portion of the joint through rate
which lay beyond the domestic boundaries of the United States.4
offered by a rail carrier to the public it also must be made available to motor or water common
carriers, 322 I.C.C. at 336-37, the railroads protested. A lower court held that it was beyond the
scope of the ICC's statutory authority under the Interstate Commerce Act to compel railroads to
furnish TOFC service to other carriers at equivalent rates. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United
States, 244 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1965). The district court stated three grounds for its decision.
First, the Act did not forbid a rail carrier to refuse to carry trailers for a competing mode of
transport. Second, the Act lacked specific reference to any grant of complusory power to the ICC
to enforce § 216(c), 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1970), which permitted voluntary through route coordina-
tion, and the structure of the Act in separately regulating rail, water and motor carriers indicated
that the Act should not be used to require coordination. Third, notwithstanding the Commission's
repudiation in Ex parte 230 of its traditional position, the court noted the Commission's long
history of support for allowing railroads discretion to grant or to deny motor carriers access to
TOFC service. 387 U.S. at 405.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's narrow construction of the Act. Citing
United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945), the American Trucking Court held that
the language of the Act granted sufficient authority to the ICC to allow it to require coordination
of motor, rail and domestic carriers. 387 U.S. at 410. The Court read the substantive sections of
the Act in coordination with the National Transportation Policy, which states a national policy to
provide a completely integrated interstate regulatory system over motor, railroad and water carri-
ers, 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970), and found broad authority in the ICC to require coordination
by railroads. 387 U.S. at 412-13.
Once jurisdiction under the Act was established, the Court found that prior policy positions
had no prohibitory effect on the ability of the ICC to alter policy to adjust to changed conditions.
Id. at 415-16.
38. 387 U.S. at 409 (quoting United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612, 616 (1945)).
39. 385 U.S. 182 (1966) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 184.
41. In Canada Packers, a manufacturer engaged American railroads to deliver raw materials
from the United States to Canada. The manufacturer was charged and paid according to a joint
through rate. Later it attacked the rate charged as unreasonable and sought reparation. The ICC
found the rates to be unreasonable and ordered the reparation. Id. at 182-83. On appeal to the
district court, the ICC ruling was affirmed. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed, 343 F.2d 563
(7th Cir. 1965), holding that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the ICC to review that portion of the
rates that took place in Canada, relying on 49 U.S.C. § l(1) (1970), which states that the Interstate
Commerce Act applies "only insofar as such transportation ... takes place within the United
States." Thus, according to the circuit court, the ICC was without power to order reparations with
respect to the Canadian portion of the goods' transport.
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While neither American Trucking Associations nor Canada
Packers dealt with coordination of rates with another agency, they re-
flected the broad power accorded the ICC to interpret and enforce the
Interstate Commerce Act. Further, these cases clearly recognized
within the Interstate Commerce Act the breadth to accommodate trans-
portation innovations.
In 1968, a bill entitled the Trade Simplification Act 42 was intro-
duced before Congress. This bill sought to reverse the ICC position
expressed in Cosmopolitan by explicitly authorizing the acceptance of
joint through rates by the ICC and the FMC.43 Further, it sought to
coordinate the intermodal movement of goods in a through route by
means of a single bill of lading acceptable to both commissions. 44 The
bill did not pass. However, it triggered a change in ICC policy toward
acceptance of joint through rates.
The ICC in 1969 instituted a rule-making proceeding, Exparte
26 1,4 5 in order to formulate rules for establishing joint through routes
between the inland United States and foreign countries. In connection
with this proceeding, the ICC issued five separate reports over its seven
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, finding precedent in News Syndicate Co. v.
New York Cent. R.R., 275 U.S. 179 (1927). The News Syndicate Court held that where a carrier
providing transport within the United States enters into a joint through international rate covering
transport in the United States and abroad, the ICC has jurisdiction to determine the reasonable-
ness of the joint through rate and to order reparations if the rate is unreasonable. 275 U.S. at 187.
The Supreme Court in Canada Packers rejected an attempt to narrow the scope of ICC juris-
diction, which attempt, if successful, would have overruled its earlier broader interpretations of
the limits of ICC jurisdiction, saying:
It is not shown, however, that the long-standing construction of the statute by both the
Commission and this Court has produced any particularly unfortunate consequences
and Congress, which could easily change the rule, has not yet seen fit to intervene. In
these circumstances, we shall not disturb the construction previously given the statute by
this Court ....
385 U.S. at 184.
42. S. 3235, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 7825 (1968); H.R. 16023, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 6796 (1968) (identical bills were introduced before both the Senate and
House).
43. Id. § 4-5.
44. Id.§9.
45. Exparte 261, In re Tariffs Containing Joint Rates and Through Routes for the Transpor-
tation of Property Between Points in the United States and Points in Foreign Countries, 337 I.C.C.
625 (1970). The goal of the proceeding was
to facilitate the through transportation of freight by intermodal carriers between the
United States and foreign countries. A shipper is benefited when he can make a contract
with the originating carrier which covers a movement through to the destination at a
total charge published in a single tariff. Moreover, the national transportation policy
should be fostered and the free flow of commerce spurred by encouraging the establish-
ment of more economical and integrated transportation services between the United
States and foreign countries.
Id. at 627.
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years of deliberation from 1969 to 1976.46 In its final report, issued in
1976, the ICC agreed to accept for filing tariffs for joint through routes,
adopting the view that the Interstate Commerce Act permits regulation
of foreign commerce insofar as the transportation takes place within
the United States.47 However, the ICC limited the extent of its substan-
tive regulation to the domestic carrier's portion of the through route,48
stating:
[w]e do not intend to assert jurisdiction over or otherwise engage in
substantive regulation of the ocean portion of the rates pursuant to
the Interstate Commerce Act. To do so, we believe, would require us
to interpret various provisions of the acts administered by the FMC
which are within the expertise of that agency. Therefore, we wish to
emphasize the fact that our jurisdiction will be invoked solely to ac-
complish substantive regulation of the domestic carrier's portion of
46. Each of the five separate decisions represents a stage in the evolution of ICC thinking on
the acceptance of joint through rates between ICC and FMC carriers. In April 1969, the ICC
advised Congress that the Interstate Commerce Act had vested the ICC with authority to accept
tariffs containing joint rates and through tariffs published by ICC-regulated carriers and FMC-
regulated ocean carriers. .4uthorizing and Fostering Joint Ratesfor International Transportation of
Property, Hearings on H.RA 12428 and H.A 12429 Before the House Comn. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1974). The ICC initiated Ex Parte 261 for the purpose of
rule making to implement the altered stance of the ICC in agreeing to receive the joint through
rates. The first rules, promulgated September 30, 1970, distinguished Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.,
13 I.C.C. 266 (1908), which had formed the basis for the earlier refusal to accept the rates, Ex
parte 261, 337 I.C.C. at 629, and issued general tariff rules. Id. at 649-52. Upon filing of petitions
for reconsideration, the ICC suspended ihe effectiveness of these rules until it could give consider-
ation to arguments for alteration put (orward by the FMC and individual nonvessel operating
common carriers by water. The FMC feared the rules would be too broad in application and
would encroach on FMC jurisdiction. On June 28, 1972, the ICC decided not to promulgate the
rules at that time, but reaffirmed its jurisdiction to accept filings ofjoint through tariffs. 341 I.C.C.
246, 247 (1972). In 1972, the ICC promulgated formal guidelines that permitted the creation of
joint rates for qualified carriers, see Hearings on HR 12428 and HR 12429, supra, at 76, and
reopened Exparte 261 for promulgation of general rules governing the acceptance of joint rates.
In 1975, the ICC adopted a broad interpretation of its powers to regulate carriers involved in
intermodal operations. 350 I.C.C. 361 (1975). This was contested by the FMC, see note 48 infra,
and was later changed as a result of the final decision issued under the Exparte 261 investigation,
351 I.C.C. 490 (1976), which finalized tariff filing rules regarding filing of joint through tariffs.
47. 351 I.C.C. 490, 491 (1976). In a sense, the ICC simply adopted the construction of the Act
imposed upon it by Canada Packers. See note 41 supra. Here, however, the special problem was
that ocean carriers and their rates were already regulated by the FMC. Thus, unlike Canada
Packers, the ICC would not exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum, but had to coordinate with the
FMC's jurisdiction.
48. This actually represents a compromise position. In one of its earlier reports, 350 I.C.C.
361 (1975), the ICC had held that it had authority to regulate the entire through route on file with
the ICC, including the authority to suspend the joint rate in its entirety. This would have had the
effect of suspending an ocean tariff on fie with the FMC. The FMC challenged this action in
FMC v. ICC, No. 75-1924, filed Sept. 19, 1975 (D.C. Cir. 1975), contending that the rules promul-
gated were beyond the ICC's jurisdiction. When the ICC released its final decision in Exparte
261,351 I.C.C. 490 (1976), this suit was dismissed on March 18, 1976, by consent of the FMC. See
FED. MARITIME COMM'N, 15TH ANN. REP. 4,54 (1976).
1245
DUKE LAW JOU R[AL
the through rate. . .49
Thus, the ICC renounced Cosmpolitan and found jurisdiction
within the Interstate Commerce Act to receive filings of joint through
rates for through routes encompassing movement of goods via both
ICC-regulated carriers and the FMC-regulated ocean carriers. Fur-
thermore, the ICC found authority to coordinate such routes with the
FMC. As a matter of policy, however, each commission was to restrict
its review of the joint through rate to that portion within its field of
expertise.50 This ruling opened the way for full establishment of
minibridge and land-bridge intermodal schemes. Even prior to the
ICC's final ruling, some minibridge systems had evolved despite the
uncertainty of the protracted rule-making procedure.51
In Pennsylvania v. ICC,52 port interests challenged the ICC's rul-
ing in Ex parte 261 on two grounds. First, the challengers contended
that the ICC lacked jurisdiction to accept joint through rates for filing.
Second, they argued that if the ICC had jurisdiction, its decision to
limit jurisdiction to the domestic portion of the through route was im-
proper.53 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected
both contentions, finding ample authority within the Interstate Com-
merce Act for ICC regulation of the domestic portion of joint through
routes. The court found that the Transportation Act of 192014 estab-
lished a statutory basis for accepting filing of joint through rates as of
that date. 5 Continued adherence to the Cosmopolitan policy of refus-
ing to accept such filings was characterized as " 'a self-imposed restric-
tion on jurisdiction.' "56 By finding authority for Exparte 261 within
the Interstate Commerce Act, the court was able to characterize ICC
forebearance as mere "policy." The court was thus able to dispose of
49. 351 I.C.C. at 491.
50. Id.
51. Even without a final report of Exparte 261, many joint through rates were on file at the
ICC under special permission granted in coordination with the FMC. See, e.g., Exparte 261, 341
I.C.C. 246, 250-52 (1972) (listing of joint intermodal tariffs on file with the ICC under special
permission).
52. 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
53. 561 F.2d at 281.
54. Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
55. 561 F.2d at 286-87.
56. Id. (quoting Exparie 261, 337 I.C.C. 625, 629 (1970)). In fact, the D.C. Circuit stated
that sections 303(a)(1l) and 316(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)(1 1),
316(c), 317(a) (1970), when taken together,
represent an explicit conferral ofjurisdiction on the ICC to accept for filing joint through
rates established by motor and ocean carriers. Indeed, in light of this language, the
Commission's prior policy of not accepting the joint rates appears to be the position most
inconsistent with the plain statutory mandate, not the rules embodied in Ex Parte No.
261.
561 F.2d at 288.
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the appeal, since the key factor in scrutinizing a change in policy of
administration is that the change be "adequately explained and justi-
fied so that the parties upon whom the policy will have an impact un-
derstand the newly adopted position." 57 The court found that Exparte
261 met the notice requirement and that changing transportation tech-
nology provided sufficient justification for the reversal of the ICC's
long-standing policy. 8
The second challenge-that the ICC improperly limited its sub-
stantive regulation to domestic portions of the through route-was re-
jected on two grounds.: 9 First, on purely statutory grounds, the
Interstate Commerce Act limits the jurisdiction of the ICC to regula-
tion "only insofar as such transportation takes place within the United
States . ... -6 As observed in Canada Packers, while the ICC has
jurisdiction to receive filings that include transport beyond its jurisdic-
tion, the jurisdictional basis for substantive regulation over the rates
charged by carriers is unclear.6 Second, the underlying rates for ocean
transit that compose the through rate are subject to FMC regulatory
authority, and as such are already regulated by that agency. By limit-
ing the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction to the domestic portion of the
joint through rate, Exparte 261 was the appropriate accommodation of
the two commissions' jurisdiction over the through route.62
57. 561 F.2d at 291.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 291-92.
60. 49 U.S.C. § 1(2) (1970).
61. See text accompanying note 41 supra. In Pennsylvania v. ICC, the D.C. Circuit saw
Canada Packers as being based upon an ICC tradition of reviewing the entire joint through rate
for reasonableness. 561 F.2d at 287. The Canada Packers Court had expressed doubt as to
whether substantive review of the entire joint through route-foreign portions as well as domestic
portions of transport-would have been upheld as an original matter in the absence of years of
contrary rulings undisturbed by Congress. 385 U.S. at 183. However, the authority to accept joint
through rates forfiling was not questioned in Canada Packers. Since Expare 261 upheld ICC
jurisdiction to receive joint through rates for filing, but specifically limited substantive review of
the rate's reasonableness to that portion of carriage which is via domestic ICC-regulated carriers,
the question of ICC jurisdiction over the entire through route was not addressed.
62. The key distinction between Canada Packers and the issue of ICC jurisdiction presented
by Exparte 261 and its appeal is that in Canada Packers the ICC could choose to regulate the
foreign portions of the through route without encroaching on any alternative regulatory mecha-
nism provided by Congress. In contrast, in Exparte 261 the ocean carriers were already subjected
to FMC regulation of ocean rates under the Shipping Act of 1916. Thus, any definition of ICC
jurisdiction to receive filings of joint through rates that include transport via FMC carriers in
ocean transport must accommodate regulatory structures provided by Congress under the Ship-
ping Act. In an earlier report of the Exparte 261 proceeding, the ICC had asserted jurisdiction to
review substantively the entire rate. 350 I.C.C. 361 (1975). See note 46 supra. When the FMC
protested that such review was beyond the authority of the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC
reconsidered and reached a satisfactory accommodation between the Interstate Commerce Act
1247
DUKE L4WJOURNAL
B. FMC Jurisdiction.
The authority for the FMC to receive joint through rates must
come from the Shipping Act of 1916.63 The Act grants the Commission
jurisdiction over those common carriers by water that are engaged in
the transportation of passengers or property between the United States
or its territories or possessions and a foreign country.' To this end, the
Act directs that common carriers by water in foreign commerce should
file with the Commission tariffs showing all the rates and charges "for
transportation to and from United States ports and foreign ports be-
tween all points on its own route and on any through route which has
been established."65
Traditionally, the FMC's position was that under the language of
the Shipping Act it, like the ICC, lacked jurisdiction to accept filings of
joint through rates for routes which included portions of carriage by
ICC-regulated carriers.16 However, in the 1960s the FMC also felt in-
tense pressure to accept such joint through rates. As the world's mari-
time industry rapidly converted to intermodal containerized fleets, the
strict noncooperation between the ICC and the FMC was perceived as
an unnecessary and artificial restraint on transport systems that were
tending to blend the various component systems into a single economi-
cally coordinated unit.
The pressure for change in policy was reflected in two FMC deci-
sions, Matson Navigation Co.-Container Freight Tariff,67 decided in
1963, and Disposition of Container Marine Lines Through Intermodal
Container Freight Tarffs,68 decided in 1968. In Matson the FMC ap-
proved a single-factor rate published by an ocean carrier that included
incidental pick-up and delivery charges as well as the ocean transit por-
tion of the total movement of the cargo.69 The pick-up and delivery
charges were for the services of ICC-regulated motor carriers. How-
ever, since this portion of the movement was characterized as merely
"incidental" to the ocean carriage, such charges could be included in
and the Shipping Act of 1916. 351 I.C.C. 490 (1976); see Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278, 284-
85 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
63. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
64. Id. § 801. To the extent that the Interstate Commerce Act regulates domestic water carri-
ers, 49 U.S.C. § 832 (1970) establishes that the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act shall
prevail over Shipping Act jurisdiction.
65. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
66. See, e.g., Alaska S.S. Co. v. FMC, 399 F.2d 623, 624 n.l (9th Cir. 1968). See generally
Hearings, supra note 3, at 14; Note, Coordination ofintermodal Transportation, supra note 11, at
261-64; Note, supra note 10, at 538-42.
67. 7 F.M.C. 480 (1963).
68. 11 F.M.C. 476 (1968).
69. 7 F.M.C. at 491.
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the tariff filed with the FMC.7 ° In Disposition of Container Marine
Lines, the Commission held lawful a through rate that included the
inland transport portion of goods being delivered to the United King-
dom so long as the charge for that portion was "broken out" or stated
separately.7 '
These administrative decisions presaged a reversal in the FMC's
interpretation of its authority under the Shipping Act. In 1969, the
FMC stated that it would accept filings of joint through rates for routes
including some ICC-regulated carriage. Then, in 1970, the FMC is-
sued regulations by which such joint through rates could be filed.7 2 Al-
though the FMC reversed its earlier position and asserted that it could
review the joint through rates without further enabling legislation, the
Commission continued to seek further legislative interpretation of its
jurisdiction to receive such rates.73
70. Id; cf Swift & Co., 6 F.M.C. 215 (1961), aft'd, 306 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (inland
transport termed "incidental" to ocean transport; thus FMC had jurisdiction over entire route).
71. 11 F.M.C. at 492.
72. On April 21, 1970, the FMC amended its tariff-filing regulations to permit filings of
through tariffs from inland points in the United States to foreign destinations. FED. MARITIME
COMM'N, IlTH ANN. REP. 16 (1972). In 1971, two United States ocean carriers fied the first
minibridge ocean tariffs. By 1976, the number of filings had grown to 170 independent intermodal
tariffs and 11 conference tariffs. FED. MARITIME COMM'N, 15TH ANN. REP. 8 (1976).
73. In 1972, the FMC gave limited support to a bill amending the Shipping Act of 1916 to
provide for single-factor rates under a through bill of lading for the transport of foreign and
domestic offshore commerce of the United States. H.R. 15465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG.
REc. 20692 (1972). This bill would have placed regulation of cargo moving in intermodal trans-
port under the control of a single body. However, the FMC objected to a provision prohibiting
antitrust immunity to participating carriers in an intermodal transport scheme. Hearings, supra
note 3, at 14.
The FMC supported two bills in the 93d Congress that would have consolidated regulatory
authority for the control of intermodal systems. H.R. 12428 and H.R. 12429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
120 CONG. REc. 1488 (1974). These bills would have amended the Shipping Act of 1916 to
provide authority for the FMC to regulate international ocean intermodal systems. In addition,
H.R. 12429 would have provided an antitrust exemption for carriers in compliance with regula-
tions promulgated for international through routes. See Hearings supra note 46, at 15.
In the 94th Congress, the FMC supported H.R. 1080, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REc.
H196 (1975), an identical bill to H.R. 12428, which had been introduced in the 93d Congress.
This bill would have placed international ocean intermodal transport systems under FMC control.
Additionally, it would have required the ICC, FMC and CAB to report to Congress on the need
for further legislation and on conflicts between the agencies that might inhibit growth of in-
termodal transactions. Hearings on H. 1080, Intermodal Transportation, Hearings Before House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1976).
The ICC and the CAB have opposed further legislation defining the limits of their jurisdic-
tion. Their opposition has centered around the implicit surrender of a portion of their jurisdiction
as a result of the FMC's control over surface portions of the intermodal systems. See Hearings on
H. 1080, supra, at 86. The two agencies felt that the interagency coordination that had resulted
in the absence of legislation was sufficient to encourage growth of intermodal technology. Id.
Justice Department opposition centered around concern that carriers operating either indepen-
dently or in conferences establishing intermodal operations would be violative of antitrust laws.
Id. 108.
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The specific question whether the FMC has statutory authority to
receive filings ofjoint through rates that include rates from carriers reg-
ulated by the ICC has not yet been brought before the courts. In Coun-
cil of North Atlantic Shpping Associations7  (hereinafter cited as Far
East) East Coast port interests raised the lack of jurisdiction of the
FMC to accept joint through rate filings.75 In the Initial Decision, the
administrative law judge rejected this challenge. Citing Matson and
Container Marine Lines as authority, the judge determined that the
FMC had jurisdiction for the acceptance of joint through rate filings.76
Furthermore, the Initial Decision found an equitable basis for the
FMC's acceptance of the rates. The regulations permitting such rates
went into effect in 1970. Since the Commission had operated under
those rules for some seven years at the time of the Initial Decision in
1977, the judge stated: "It is a little late in the day. . . to challenge the
Commission's acceptance of intermodal (including minibridge) tariffs.
The Commission's jurisdiction to accept minibridge tariffs is clear." 77
On appeal to the full Commission, the petitioners again raised lack
of-jurisdiction to accept joint through rates.78 In affirming the Initial
Decision, the FMC rejected this claim, citing Pennsylvania v. ICC.79
The affirmance in that case of the ICC's authorization to receive joint
through rates and to confine its jurisdiction to the land portion of the
through movement was seen by the FarEast court as "plainly premised
upon the FMC exercising jurisdiction over the water portion of the
joint rate just as the ICC regulates the land portion."8" The Far East
decision also cited other federal court decisions that "have assumed the
74. No. 73-38 (F.M.C. Aug. 8, 1978). The FMC adopted the Initial Decision by Administra-
tive Law Judge John E. Cograve (F.M.C. July 1, 1977).
75. Opening Brief of Complainants Council of North Ad. Shipping Ass'ns; The Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO; and Del. River Port Auth. at 2. This case involved a land-bridge
system that transported containerized goods cross-continent via rail and then to the Far East via
ocean carrier.
76. Initial Decision, slip op. at 92.
77. Id.
78. In excepting to the Initial Decision, the complainants stated:
Prior to 1970, the Commission had always maintained that it could not accept for
filing joint rates because it lacked statutory authority to do so....
However, by 1970, the Commission decided to forego legislation and instead,
through rule-making, promulgated regulations purportedly governing the "Filing of
Through Rates and Through Routes"....
...Complainants contend that rule-making in 1970 cannot lawfully accomplish an
objective which in 1968 and 1969 the Commission itself perceived would require legisla-
tion.
Exceptions to Initial Decision and Supporting Brief on Behalf of Council of North Atd. Shipping
Ass'ns; The Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO; and Del. River Port Auth. at 8-9 (footnotes
omitted).
79. 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cited in Far East, Final Decision, slip op. at 5.
80. Final Decision, slip op. at 6. (footnote omitted).
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existence of FMC jurisdiction to accept joint tariffs for filing."'' t
Such reasoning involves some degree of boot-strapping. In Penn-
sylvania v. ICC, the court was involved with interpretation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, not of the Shipping Act. The language of the
Shipping Act is not as expansive as that of the Interstate Commerce
Act. Nonetheless, in Far East the FMC made an implicit assumption
that it had jurisdiction under the Shipping Act and that it was merely
reversing an administrative "policy," just as the ICC had done in Penn-
sylvania v. ICC. Therefore, following this reasoning, the FMC's only
obligation was to explain and justify the change.
The Shipping Act in section 18(b)(1)82 provides for through routes
only between United States ports and foreign countries. Thus, a strict
reading of the Act might limit FMC authority to accept joint through
rate filings solely to receiving ocean rates. To justify its acceptance of
the joint through rates, the FMC must articulate more clearly the statu-
tory basis for acceptance. Without this basis, the FMC cannot justify
its action by relying upon earlier FMC administrative decisions, court
decisions that did not address the issue, or decisions interpreting the
Interstate Commerce Act.
However, two factors strongly suggest that the Shipping Act does
provide adequate authority to allow filings of joint through rates with
the FMC. First, the FMC only accepts the joint through ratesforfiling.
The Commission does not exercise substantive regulation over the do-
mestic portion of the through route. It limits its regulation to the ocean
transit portion of the through rate, which is "broken out" or stated sep-
arately from the joint through rate. 3 In essence, the FMC exercises
81. Id. at 6 n.8 (citing Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975), and Penn-
sylvania v. FMC, 392 F. Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1975), as cases where the court implicitly recognized
minibridge schemes built around joint through rate structures). In Sea/rain, complaining ports
sought a preliminary injunction against the operation of a Euro-Gulf minibridge that diverted
cargo overland from the Gulf states to Atlantic ports for unloading. 518 F.2d at 177. In denying a
preliminary injunction, however, the Seatrain court did not address the jurisdictional issue.
Rather, it recognized the then ongoing FMC administrative determination. Id. at 178. Therefore,
Seatrain is less than compelling as authority for the lawfulness of the minibridge tariffs.
Similarly, Pennsylvania v. FMC arose when certain port interests sought to preliminarily
enjoin the operation of the Far East minibridge. The case was at that time before the FMC in
administrative proceedings. As in Seatrain, the court considered only the grounds for a prelimi-
nary injunction and declined to address the merits of the case in recognition of the action pending
before the FMC. 392 F. Supp. at 801.
82. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1) (1970).
83. FMC requirements for filing joint through rates, are in part, as follows:
(I) tariffs naming single factor through intermodal rates shall show the through rate
together with the division, rate or charge that is to be collected by water carrier subject to
the Shipping Act of 1916, for its port-to-port portion of the through service, which divi-
sion, rate or charge shall be treated as a proportional rate subject to the provisions of the
Shipping Act of 1916. ...
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jurisdiction over the movement from port to port in accordance with
section 18(b)(1) of the Shipping Act. Permitting a joint through rate
that covers the total movement should not be ultra vires so long as the
regulatory power granted the FMC is not exercised beyond the Act's
limits.
This argument is bolstered by the view that the Shipping Act's del-
egation of authority to the FMC should be read broadly to allow re-
sponsiveness to technological innovation and changing conditions.
American Trucking Associations and Canada Packers, although on
their facts applicable only to the ICC, are relevant insofar as they read
into the transportation acts Congress' intent that the FMC and the ICC
be able to respond in innovative ways to altered technology.84 A broad
congressional intent to foster coordination and development of trans-
portation resources is also evidenced in the Declaration of National
Transportation Policy, 5 passed by Congress in 1940. In this Declara-
tion, Congress established a national policy in favor of the develop-
ment, coordination and preservation of a national transportation
system by water, highway, rail and other means adequate to meet the
commercial requirements of the United States. 6 Thus, despite the lack
of explicit authority in the Shipping Act itself, the FMC should have
the same expansive ability as the ICC to respond to technological
changes.
Given the premise that the FMC should have broad authority
under the Shipping Act, the reversal of the FMC's earlier position that
it would not accept joint through rates which included ICC-regulated
portions should be subjected to review similar to that undertaken by
the court in Pennsylvania v. ICC. To this end, the change of policy
(2) When the through rate is to be constructed by combining the ocean rates with in-
land rates published in tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.. . the
ICC tariff... must be incorporated into the through intermodal tariff and filed with the
Federal Maritime Commission.
46 C.F.R. § 536.15(d) (1977) (emphasis in original).
84. See, e.g., United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1932):
The Shipping Act is a comprehensive measure bearing a relation to common carri-
ers by water substantially the same as that borne by the Interstate Commerce Act to
interstate carriers by land .... In its general scope and purpose, as well as in its terms,
that act closely parallels the Interstate Commerce Act; and we cannot escape the conclu-
sion that Congress intended that the two acts, each in its own field, should have like
interpretation, application and effect.
Once it is resolved that the Shipping Act and the Interstate Commerce Act should be simi-
larly construed, American Trucking.4ss'ns and Canada Packers may be relied upon in determin-
ing the breadth of the Shipping Act.
85. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, § 1, 54 Stat. 899 (codified at 49 U.S.C. preceding § I
(1970)).
86. Id.
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must be explained and justified.87 The extended interval since the
FMC's reversal of position in 1969, its promulgation of revised rules
concerning filing of joint through rates in 1970 and the lengthy period
of operation of these rules provided ample explanation to all parties.
That the action was "justified" was shown in Pennsylvania v. ICC, in
which changing transportation patterns and advancing technology were
held to be adequate justification for a similar reversal of an ICC pol-
icy.88 Further, the now-extended operation of the FMC rules makes it
unlikely that, after the fact, the Commission will be found to have act-
ed ultra vires.
The lack of specific enabling legislation to support the change of
policy by the ICC and the FMC is not a critical failure that should
preclude the commissions from adapting their policies in response to
transport patterns or schemes. Pennsylvania v. ICC suggests two proper
responses to changing commerical realities. One is to enact corrective
legislation. The other, equally valid, is to change regulatory policy
when such a policy change is within the agency's statutory authority.89
Thus, under an expansive reading of the Shipping Act, the FMC
should be found to have jurisdiction to accept filings of joint through
rates.
In summary, recent developments make it clear that the ICC and
the FMC will coordinate their jurisdiction to accept joint through tar-
iffs. Furthermore, the courts will give an expansive interpretation to
the enabling statutes of the agencies, thereby reducing the likelihood of
successful challenge to their jurisdiction.
II. ATTACKING INTERMODAL SCHEMES VIA STATUTORY CAUSES OF
ACTION BEFORE THE FMC
In addition to challenging the jurisdiction of either agency to ac-
cept joint through rates, opponents of minibridge and land-bridge
schemes have sought relief under statutory causes of action before the
FMC. These causes of action generally prohibit predatory practices by
carriers that divert a port's cargo to other locations, thus protecting the
port's trade and commerce.
There are a number of carrier practices that can result in diversion
of cargo from a port. For example, the carrier can divert cargo by
charging an unjustifiably low ocean rate from a single port if the rate
has the effect of drawing cargo from other ports. The carrier can also
87. See Pennsylvania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978). See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
88. 561 F.2d at 283.
89. Id. at 289.
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engage in port equalization schemes by which the rate charged for
ocean shipment from a particular port is lowered to that of a closer
port, making the two equally attractive to the shipper. Equalization
may be accomplished in three ways. The simplest method is for the
carrier to pay the shipper the extra cost involved in the overland trans-
port. Second, the carrier may use proportional rates in computing the
cost to the shipper, deducting specified differentials from the ocean
tariff for different areas in order to equalize the cost to the shipper.
Third, the carrier may accept delivery of cargo at a port, then ship the
goods overland to another port, absorbing any excess costs into the
ocean rate.90 Each variation has a similar result: the diversion of goods
by making alternative ports as attractive to the shipper as the original
port.
An equalization scheme is not unlawful in principle; it becomes
unlawful only if it tends to divert from ports traffic that originates in
areas "naturally tributary" to those ports. 91 The concept of naturally
tributary cargo is long lived in maritime law and was a source of litiga-
tion even prior to the development of intermodal transportation sys-
tems. 92  It originated in sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act of
19 16, which prohibit discrimination against ports by carriers, and was
90. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 9 F.M.C. 338, 345 (1966).
91. Id. at 346. See Stockton Port Dist., 9 F.M.C. 12, 20-21 (1965), a 'd, 369 F.2d 380 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967).
92. Actions based on a theory that carriers' practices discriminate against ports by diverting
naturally tributary traffic arose shortly after the passage of the Shipping Act of 1916. In Port
Utils. Comm'n,l Dec. U.S. Mar. Comm'n 61 (1925), the United States Shipping Board, predeces-
sor to the FMC, held that differentials in rates between North Atlantic and South Atlantic ports
were so disparate as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States. The Board noted, in
regard to grouping of ports by shipping conferences for the purposes of ratemaking, that "the
board is not disposed to disturb port groupings which have prevailed for a considerable length of
time and to which business has accustomed itself, except for very strong and compelling reasons."
Id at 67.
Again, in Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 Dec. U.S. Mar. Comm'n 220 (1939), the United
States Maritime Commission stated as a policy: "We do not look with favor upon the attempt of
carriers by artificial means to control the flow of traffic not naturally tributary to their lines." Id.
at 226; see, e.g., Reduced Rates on Machinery and Tractors from United States Ports to Ports in
Puerto Rico, 9 F.M.C. 465, 476 (1966), reaff'd, 10 F.M.C. 248 (1967); City of Portland, Ore., 4
F.M.B. 664, 679 (1955).
93. Section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970) , prohibits
any common carrier by water or other person subject to this chapter, either acting alone
or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly. . . to make or give any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality or
description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, local-
ity or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever. . ..
Section 17 of the Act, 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1970), provides that "f[lo common carrier by water in
foreign commerce shall. . . charge or collect any rate, fare or charge which is unjustly discrimina-
tory between shippers or ports, or unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States as coin-
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strengthened by the general congressional perspective exhibited in sec-
tion 8 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.14 Section 8 expresses a
congressional intent to "investigate territorial regions and zones tribu-
tary to such ports, taking into consideration the economics of transpor-
tation by rail, water and highway and the natural direction of the flow
of commerce."95 Additionally, section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act
of 193696 has been construed by the FMC as an expression of congres-
sional intent that cargo should not be diverted from ports by carriers
acting alone or in concert.97
These statutes have been amalgamated by the FMC into an ad-
ministrative cause of action before the FMC. It is available to ports to
protect themselves from carrier practices tending to divert naturally
tributary cargo. The older decisions by the FMC suggest that this
cause of action could be applied to block minibridge-type schemes that
would have an effect of diverting cargo.98 Recent FMC decisions, how-
ever, demonstrate a conscious reevaluation of the traditional FMC
stance on cargo diversion in an effort to accommodate commercial and
technological innovation. Earlier FMC decisions did not comprehen-
sively set out the criteria to be used in applying the naturally tributary
concept, but instead applied a case-by-case method, using
microeconomic models in determining harm caused by the practice.
More recent cases involving naturally tributary cargo in an intermodal
context have required that the FMC reconsider the underpinnings of
the naturally tributary concept to come to grips with the real economic
trade-offs offered by intermodal schemes. An understanding of the
concept requires a preliminary review of the traditional means of anal-
ysis, following which the evolution of the concept to accommodate in-
pared with their foreign competitors."
94. 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). While the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
places responsibility for its execution on the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the
Army, the FMC has seen the expression of congressional intent as imposing a duty on the FMC to
consider the interests of ports in their review of carrier rates and charges, using as a standard the
naturally tributary areas to a port described in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. See, e.g., Port of
N.Y. Auth. v. FMC, 429 F.2d 663, 670 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971) (section 8
is an expression of congressional policy and must be considered by the FMC in exercising its
authority); Stockton Port Dist., 9 F.M.C. 12, 29 (1965), atd, 369 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967).
95. 46 U.S.C. § 867 (1970).
96. Id. § 1115.
97. Section 205 provides that "it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, either
directly or indirectly ... to prevent or attempt to prevent any other such carrier from serving any
port designed for the accommodation of ocean-going vessels. ... Id. Like section 8 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, see note 94 supra, section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
has served as an expression of congressional intent concerning diversion of freight. See, e.g.,
Intermodal Serv. to Portland, Ore., 17 F.M.C. 106, 134-35 (1973).
98. See text accompanying notes 99-114 infra.
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termodal and minibridge schemes will be analyzed.
A. Naturally Tributary Cargo.
In Reduced Rates on Machinery and Tractors From United States
Ports to Ports in Puerto Rico,99 several carriers serving the ocean route
from Florida to Puerto Rico engaged in a round of rate reductions of
the carriage of heavy machinery over that route. Each carrier had cer-
tain inherent advantages. One, a barge service, could offer the cheapest
service; others could offer speedier delivery."l°  The FMC found that
nine percent of the heavy machinery that normally would have passed
through ports in the North Atlantic was attracted by the reduced rates
overland to Florida for ocean shipment. The FMC determined this to
be an unlawful diversion of cargo naturally tributary to North Atlantic
ports.
The factual showing required of the complaining port to support a
finding of unlawful diversion was not a rigorous one. The nine-percent
diversion of machinery was sufficient to support the determination of
unlawfulness without additional supporting data regarding total impact
on the ports in terms of absolute amounts of cargo moving through the
port.101
Furthermore, the FMC held that a port's right to naturally tribu-
tary cargo was "fundamental."10 z Thus, access to the cause of action
by one who is harmed by diversion is not dependent on the amount of
cargo diverted. Any "significant" diversion of naturally tributary cargo
triggers the cause of action.
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. ' (hereinafter cited as SACL), the
FMC held that a scheme by which a carrier accepted cargo at the port
of Jacksonville, Florida, then shipped the cargo overland to Miami for
ocean shipment (absorbing the overland cost differential between the
ports) was an unlawful diversion of naturally tributary cargo./°4 Ac-
cording to the findings of fact, the diverted cargo originated in areas up
to 360 miles away from Jacksonville. The goods were attracted to Jack-
99. 9 F.M.C. 465 (1966), rea9'd, 10 F.M.C. 248 (1967).
100. 9 F.M.C. at 466-69.
101. Id. at 468. The FMC derived the nine-percent figure by determining the amount of cargo
that originated in areas where the rail rates were favorable to North Atlantic ports but was
shipped overland to South Atlantic ports. No information on port activity overall was considered
in the determination. "[Tihe actual volume of a commodity in a trade or the relative amount of
that volume transported by any particular carrier is irrelevant if area differentials not supported
by transportation conditions have been shown to exist." Id. at 477.
102. Id. at 476.
103. 9 F.M.C. 338 (1966).
104. Id. at 347.
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sonville by geography and "normal inland transit routes,"'' 0 5 making
the cargo naturally tributary to Jacksonville, not to Miami. The FMC
again interpreted the naturally tributary concept expansively, giving
weight to time, distance and cost differences and to historic patterns of
transport in determining the cargo to be naturally tributary to Jackson-
ville. 1
0 6
In SACL, the FMC rejected a "but for" test for determining
whether cargo is naturally tributary to a port. Such a test would desig-
nate as naturally tributary cargo that would have passed through a port
"but for" the diversion scheme operated by the carrier. 107 This
mechanical test, with a low threshold for triggering the cause of action,
was rejected in favor of a more extensive consideration of all the cir-
cumstances.10 8
For example, in Stockton Port District,"°9 the area naturally tribu-
tary to a port was held to be determined by an inquiry into several
factors: the geographic location of the port, economic factors and his-
toric patterns of transport. The FMC held that a mere mileage advan-
tage-the fact that one port is closer to a shipper than another port-is
not in itself proof that the cargo generated is naturally tributary to the
closer port.I" If two or more ports exist in the same geographic area,
and both may make a legitimate claim to the area served, then a car-
rier's employment of equalization tactics does not divert naturally trib-
utary cargo and is not unlawful."' Further, the FMC held that the
plaintiff must show substantial harm caused by the diversion scheme in
order to state a claim."
2
Once a port has made a substantial showing that a carrier is engag-
105. Id. at 346. The distance from Canton, Ga. to Jacksonville is 360 miles; from Jacksonville
to Miami, 360 miles.
106. Id. at 348.
107. Id. at 350.
108. Id. at 346-47.
109. 9 F.M.C. 12 (1965), a§'d, 369 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967).
In Stockton, the Pacific Westbound Conference adopted a rule that allowed carriers to limit their
calls within the San Francisco Bay Area by equalizing overland delivery of cargo to central loca-
tions. Stockton claimed this practice was unlawfully diverting naturally tributary cargo from
Stockton to San Francisco ports. 9 F.M.C. at 13.
110. 9 F.M.C. at 21-22.
Ill. Id. at 24. See Intermodal Serv. to Portland, Ore., 17 F.M.C. 106, 126-27 (1973).
112. 9 F.M.C. 12, 29 (1965). This standard of showing substantial harm was imposed upon
the complainant in Intermodal Serv. to Portland, Ore., 17 F.M.C. 106 (1973), where the FMC
found no evidence of a "drying up" of port terminal facilities as a result of the overland transport
of container cargo from Portland to Seattle. Id. at 133. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
The requirement of substantial harm as a prerequisite to a finding of unlawful diversion is in
contrast to earlier FMC precedent. See, e.g., Proportional Commodity Rates on Cigarettes and
Tobacco, 6 F.M.B. 48, 56 (1960) (substantial harm shown to port in spite of small amount of cargo
actually diverted by diversion scheme).
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Lug in practices that cause diversion of naturally tributary cargo, prece-
dent allows the carrier only one defense-that service at that port was
inadequate to transship the diverted cargo." 3 The carrier must show
that the service was generally inadequate; merely showing that the port
had a single inadequacy in any respect is not sufficient to carry the
burden."14
The concept of naturally tributary cargo has traditionally centered
around a model of a predatory carrier willfully engaging in activities
designed to divert cargo. Thus, the remedy-an action by the ag-
grieved port-has been narrowly drawn to limit the issues before the
FMC. Of necessity, the degree of harm required to be shown by the
port is "substantial harm." The carrier is barred from asserting a full
range of defenses. However, once the model moves beyond this very
limited, one carrier-one product-one port character into larger schemes
that reflect fundamental changes in transportation patterns, it cannot
provide sophisticated review reaching optimum decisions on their le-
gality. Instead, there is a need for wider inquiry into the totality of
circumstances, as is clearly shown by Stockton Port District.
B. Applying Naturally Tributary Concepts to Intermodal Transport
Schemes.
The concept of port discrimination provides a basis for challenges
to the institution of minibridge operations by joint rail-ocean carriers.
Based on the expansive interpretation of the concept of naturally tribu-
tary cargo contained in Reduced Rates to Puerto Rico and SACL, ports
would seem to have a strong argument that such schemes are unlawful.
However, the application of the concept in the intermodal context re-
quires close examination of the continuing viability of the concept of
naturally tributary cargo as an affirmative bar to activities by carriers,
including technologically innovative activities that have an effect of di-
verting cargo. In the cases that have brought the two concepts into
direct conflict, the FMZC has generally upheld the innovative system,
limiting the scope of the protection offered the port interest.
113. See SACL, 9 F.M.C. 338, 344-45 (1966); City of Portland, Ore., 5 F.M.B. 118 (1956)
(equalization between ports justified on basis of inadequacy of steamship service to Portland);
Port Comm'n of Beaumont, Tex., 2 Dec. U.S. Mar. Comm'n 699, 702 (1943) (diversion of cargo
justified because of special pier-handling requirements for Sea Train ships).
The language of section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, see note 97 supra, suggests
a possible origin of this limitation of defenses by the FMC. The Act makes it unlawful for a
carrier to attempt to prevent any carrier from "serving any port designed for the accommodation
of ocean going vessels." 46 U.S.C. § 1115 (1970).
114. See Stockton, 9 F.M.C. at 33-34.
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In Investigation of Overland and OCP Rates and Absorptions,"5
West Coast carriers conducted an intermodal operation that reduced
ocean rates to and from the Far East to account for the costs of over-
land rail transport. This allowed shippers in the Midwestern United
States to ship to the Far East via the Pacific coast at a rate on par with
Atlantic, Gulf and Great Lakes all-water routes. This activity was
challenged on the ground that the rates unlawfully attracted naturally
tributary cargo away from ports through which it traditionally moved.
The FMC, and later the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected the
notion that an entire region could be naturally tributary to a range of
ports or to a seaboard." 6 While Overland-OCP Rates was concerned
with movement of container traffic via rail-ocean carriers, the FMC's
decision was heavily influenced by the long history of competitive ac-
tivity by Pacific Coast carriers. They had engaged in rate reductions on
their ocean tariffs in order to attract cargo from the mid-continental
United States for over a century in competing with East Coast all-water
routes to the Far East. Although improved technology made the com-
petition more threatening to the Eastern ports, the long tradition of
such competitive practices, predating any federal regulation of the
shipping industry, served as adequate notice of the carrier's activi-
ties. 117 Further, great weight was given to the increased competition
brought about by the practice, presumably improving service to the
shipper and the public." 8 While recognizing limits to the concept of
naturally tributary cargo and tacitly recognizing that innovations that
tend to increase competition between areas may be judged by a more
lenient standard, the strong reliance of Overland-OCP Rates on the
traditional patterns of carrier activity makes it less than compelling
precedent on the lawfulness of truly innovative intermodal schemes.
A second stage in the adjustment of the naturally tributary concept
to technological innovation was reached in Intermodal Service to Port-
land, Oregon."9 In that case, the FMC found lawful a scheme by
which loaded containers were sent overland from Portland to Seattle
for ocean transportation to the Far East. First, the FMC held that
115. 12 F.M.C. 184 (1969), af'd sub nom. Port of N.Y. Auth. v. FMC, 429 F.2d 663 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
116. 12 F.M.C. at 222-26; 429 F.2d at 670. The court would not hold as a matter of law that
equalization practices were discriminatory simply because a port has a lower inland mileage ad-
vantage.
117. 12 F.M.C. at 207; 429 F.2d at 667.
118. 429 F.2d at 669. In the FMC opinion, competition was held to be "the basic distinguish-
ing factor in the establishment of Overland/OCP rates. There is no contention that the level of
Overland/OCP rates is so low as to be noncompensatory, detrimental to commerce, or otherwise
unfair or unlawful." 12 F.M.C. at 206.
119. 17 F.M.C. 106 (1973).
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land and Seattle served distinctly different geographic regions, so that
under the Stockton Port District criterion the naturally tributary con-
cept would apply. 2 On the basis of Overland-OCP Rates, however,
the FMC held that neither port could claim as naturally tributary the
cargo generated from inland areas geographically accessible to both
and which historically had been shipped from both ports. 2 ' The FMC
made no distinction for containerized cargo moving in an intermodal
transport scheme, holding that cargo does not cease to be naturally
tributary simply because it moves in an innovative way.' 22 Intermodal
Service to Portland also upheld FMC precedent by allowing the carrier
to defend by proving inadequacy of the port to handle the cargo di-
verted. 123
Intermodal Service to Portland is best seen as a compromise deci-
sion, attempting to reconcile the development of alternative means of
transport with traditional maritime concepts which protect port inter-
ests. The final remedy granted the FMC-that carriers wishing to serve
Portland via indirect overland service must make a direct call on Port-
land at least on alternate sailings' 24 -represents a self-conscious bal-
ancing of the interests of the port, shipper, carrier and the public.
Significantly, the lack of showing by Portland of any absolute loss be-
cause of the intermodal scheme in terms of declining revenue or slack-
ened activity was given great weight by the FMC in holding the
diversion lawful. In the absence of substantial loss in absolute terms of
declining port activity, the FMC did not find the required injury to the
port.' 25 This adds immensely to the costs of a port wishing to challenge
120. Id. at 126.
121. Nor does cargo cease to be naturally tributary because of the direction in which it moves,
either outbound or inbound. Id. at 127.
122. Id. at 130.
123. Id. at 128-13 1. However, the opinion in Intermodal Service to Portland expressed misgiv-
ing about so extending the inadequacy defense. It recognized that the carrier itself could make the
service inadequate at a port simply by not calling there. See City of Portland, 4 F.M.B. 664, 675
(1955), for an example of inadequacy of steamship service being held adequate justification for
diversion of cargo. In such a scheme, the carriers themselves could make service inadequate by
not calling there.
124. 17 F.M.C. at 139.
125. Id. at 133. Compare this requirement of absolute harm with the requirement of Reduced
Rates to Puerto Rico and SACL, in which the complaining port needed only to show that a sub-
stantial amount of cargo was being diverted in order to show the requisite injury.
One may trace the evolution of the increasingly tough threshold injury requirement to the
Intermodal Service to Portland standard by reviewing the line of decisions beginning with Propor-
tional Commodity Rates on Cigarettes and Tobacco, 6 F.M.B. 48, 56 (1960). In that case, in
response to a contention by a defendant that the volume of cargo diverted by its practices was so
small as to have no impact on the port, the FMB held that a significant portion of the volume of
that cargo was diverted and that that was sufficient to trigger a cause of action for relief by the
port. In Reduced Rates to Puerto Rico and SA CL, the claimants were required to show, in dollar
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an intermodal scheme and adversely affects its chances of successful
attack on the scheme.
Intermodal Service to Portland left considerable haziness as to the
legality of minibridge operations. In this uncertain climate, port inter-
ests sought injunctive relief in federal court to block minibridge opera-
tions while challenging their lawfulness before the FMC. Although
this tactic had early success at the district court level, 126 two subsequent
court of appeals decisions, Delaware River Port Authority v. Transameri-
can Trailer Transport, Inc.,' 27 and Texas v. Seatrain International,128
have strictly limited the availability of a preliminary injunction as
means by which a port interest may block operation of a minibridge
scheme. In each case, the FMC as intervenor said the likelihood of
success before the FMC on the merits of the port discrimination claim
was slight.' 29
In Seatrain, the Fifth Circuit weighed the relative injury to the
ports seeking to enjoin the minibridge and to the ports to whom the
cargo was being transported overland by minibridge should the injunc-
tion be granted 30 Finding that the injury to one port should the in-
junction be granted would be essentially the same as that suffered by
amounts, that the port had sustained substantial harm. Finally, in Intermodal Service to Portland
the FMC hinted that the success of the port claimant's showing was dependent upon showing an
absolute decline in port activity. Thus, Intermodal Service to Portland indicates that the port must
carry a burden of showing a danger of a "drying up" of port business because of the challenged
practice. 17 F.M.C. at 133.
The trend suggested by this line of cases is to require consideration of the diversion scheme's
impact on the total volume served by the port. Although the earlier cases used a microeconomic
model involving a single commodity, Intermodal Service to Portland indicates that the inquiry
must be broader, focusing on the total impact on the port. Furthermore, the inquiry must include
considerations of carrier efficiency and shipper convenience. See text accompanying notes 147-48
infra.
This broadening of the inquiry might well have a devastating effect on the potential chal-
lenger's costs in meeting the standards of proof required of a challenging port and on its chances
of demonstrating adequate injury in an era of expanding trade volume.
126. See, e.g., Delaware River Port Auth. v. United States Lines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), in which an injunction was granted to a longshoremen's association and the Port of
Philadelphia on grounds of extensive injury to the city caused by the transport practices of a
carrier. (Cargo was shipped overland from Philadelphia to Port Newark, N.J. for ocean shipment,
and the overland costs were absorbed by the ocean shipper). But see Pennsylvania v. FMC, 392 F.
Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1975) (injunction denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
127. 501 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974). Philadelphia has been a leading opponent of minibridge
schemes. Because it is located 13 to 16 hours from the open sea up the Delaware River, carriers
have taken advantage of intermodal technology to divert cargo overland to other ports. See, e.g.,
Delaware River Port Auth. v. United States Lines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(injunction sought to halt overland diversions of containers to Port Newark, NJ.).
128. 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. Id at 181 n.6; 501 F.2d at 920.
130. 518 F.2d at 179-80.
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the other should the injunction be denied, the court considered the ulti-
mate likelihood that the plaintiff ports would prevail on the merits. Ac-
cepting the intervenor FMC'sjudgment that the likelihood was low, the
Seatrain court declined to enjoin the minibridge scheme.' 31 Thus, it is
apparent that unless the port seeking an injunction against a
minibridge scheme can carry the burden of showing promise of even-
tual success on the merits, injunctive relief is not likely to be available.
In Overland-OCP Rates and Intermodal Service to Portland, the
FMC took initial steps to adapt the concept of naturally tributary cargo
to intermodal transport schemes. However, these decisions did not
squarely address the legality of the emerging minibridge and land-
bridge schemes. Overland-OCP Rates relied heavily on historic pat-
terns of carriage. Intermodal Service to Portland was a self-conscious
balancing of the interests of two ports, and the remedy granted to Port-
land was tailored so as to apply only to the peculiar facts of the case.
The formulation of general principles was thus deferred to future dis-
putes.
C. Revision of the Law of Port Discrimination-The Far East Case.
The opportunity to formulate general principles of minibridge reg-
ulation arose in the Far East case.' 32 When the action was brought in
1973, the FMC indicated that it would serve as the means by which
general guidelines for minibridge operations would be formulated. 33
Consequently, the case attracted the attention of ports, carriers, ship-
pers and many intervenors. 134
Far East involved a challenge to the practive of moving container-
ized cargo via a coordinated rail-ocean movement across the continen-
tal United States to its destination in the Far East. Cargo moving from
the Far East would terminate the ocean portion of its movement on the
West Coast and would travel via rail across the United States. The Far
East land-bridge would have the effect of diverting cargo that histori-
cally had moved via all-water routes from Atlantic and Gulf Coast
ports to West Coast ports, where the cargo would be transshipped for
the ocean movement to the Far East. The rates offered by the
minibridge were set at levels competitive with those of the all-water
131. Id. at 180-81.
132. See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra.
133. Initial Decision, slip op. at 4.
134. Id. at 4-5. The initial suit was brought by complainants North Atlantic Shipping As-
sociations; International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO; and the Delaware River Ports
Authority against fifteen ocean carriers engaging in minibridge activities. Joining the suit as a
complainant was the Massachusetts Ports Authority. There were 37 intervening parties, represent-
ing Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific ports authorities, railroads, and shipping and labor organizations.
Id. at 1-2.
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route. Goods moving from the Far East to the eastern portion of the
United States could also utilize the minibridge.
135
The Far East minibridge system was challenged before the FMC
as violating sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Shipping Act and section 8 of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 in that it caused substantial injury to
Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports, labor organizations and maritime-re-
lated industries; illegally diverted naturally tributary cargo from Atlan-
tic and Gulf Coast ports; and achieved this diversion through unlawful
absorption practices and unreasonably low rates. 136
In its Initial Decision, the FMC rejected on three grounds the
ports' contention that the minibridge operation unlawfully diverted
naturally tributary cargo. First, the complainants failed to carry the
burden of showing substantial harm.' 37 Second, the concept of natu-
rally tributary cargo was viewed narrowly.' 38  Third, expanded de-
fenses were held to be available to the carrier.'
39
The complaining port interests introduced evidence showing that
1.6 percent of the total cargo that moved through the complaining ports
and 4.6 percent of all containerized cargo was diverted by the
minibridge operation." When measured against the simultaneous
growth in overall traffic and increased Euro-Cal minibridge operations,
these losses were found to be insufficient to constitute substantial
harm.14 Further, the decision criticized the statistics offered by the
complainants, noting that the figures used to show diversion of cargo
failed to take into account cargo that would not have passed through
the ports in any event.'
42
The Initial Decision adopted a narrowed definition of naturally
tributary cargo. The opinion emphasized that the congressional intent
135. A European minibridge from the western portion of the country somewhat offset the flow
of westward-bound minibridge cargo, but the net flow was strongly to Far Eastern destinations.
Id. at 11. The Euro-Cal minibridge, moving containerized cargo eastward across the United
States for a shipment from Atlantic ports to Europe, offset the impact of the freight moving west
over the Far East minibridge from Atlantic ports. Additionally, the handling and transport of Far
East-bound containers from Atlantic ports generated revenues for the originating locales that
tended to offset the impact of the Far East minibridge. Id. at 36.
136. Opening Brief of Complainants at 1.
137. Initial Decision, slip op. at 36.
138. Id. at 72.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id. at 36. The Initial Decision noted that only 35% of the total growth in Far East
container traffic moved via the minibridge. Id. The Initial Decision also considered the impact of
the minibridge on the various ports and found that the total volume of traffic had grown and was
continuing to grow following the institution of the minibridge operation in these ports.
Some port facilities were operating at capacity, even with diversions of cargo. Id. at 36-42.
141. Id. at 36.
142. Id. at 35-36.
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expressed in section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920143 is only
one of many policy aims that must be applied in accordance with other
national goals.1" Thus, the Initial Decision indicated that the FMC
would balance port interests against carrier and shipper interests on a
larger scale.' 45
The Initial Decision adopted a two-step analysis. First, the FMC
must determine whether there has been a diversion of naturally tribu-
tary cargo. The Initial Decision viewed the concept of naturally tribu-
tary cargo as constantly changing 46 and included the shipper's
preferences as one of the factors to be considered in making the deter-
uination.147 If the FMC determines that naturally tributary cargo has
been diverted, then the second step is a consideration of the reasonable-
ness of the diversion, taking into account the cost to the carrier of direct
service, the competitive situation existing in the area and any other
transportation factors that bear upon the carrier's ability to provide di-
rect service.'n8 In this respect, the Initial Decision directly contradicts
the line of FMC precedent holding that the only defense a carrier may
assert to a charge of diversion of naturally tributary cargo is that the
complainant port's facility is inadequate to provide the service to the
carrier. 4 9 Furthermore, the "but for" test for determining local cargo,
specifically rejected by the FMC in earlier cases, is resurrected by the
Initial Decision and promoted as a proper test for determining whether
or not cargo claimed to be local is in fact naturally tributary to the port
claiming unlawful diversion. 5 In sum, the Initial Decision of the Far
East case strongly endorsed innovation in the maritime shipping indus-
try to accommodate improved technology.
The Initial Decision was appealed to the full Commission by port
interests on the ground that the Initial Decision did not properly for-
mulate the scope of protection for naturally tributary cargo.' 51 In af-
143. See note 94 supra and text accompanying note 95 supra.
144. Initial Decision, slip op. at 64-65.
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id.
147. Id. The other factors listed in the Initial Decision were generally adopted by the full
Commission. Final Decision, slip op. at 7-8. See text accompanying note 153 infra. C! In-
termodal Serv. to Portland, Ore., 17 F.M.C. 106, 126-28 (1973) (geographic, commercial and eco-
nomic considerations are relevant in determining whether cargo is "naturally tributory"). The
Initial Decision included as one of the factors the relevant inland transportation rates. Initial
Decision, slip op. at 72. The consideration of transportation alternatives available to accommo-
date the shipper in a certain area adds a variable to the determination of naturally tributary cargo
that allows the carrier greater freedom in offering innovative service to the shipper.
148. Id.
149. See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
150. Initial Decision, slip op. at 79 n.88. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
151. Exceptions to Initial Decision and Supporting Brief, supra note 78, at 17-20. The coin-
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firming, the FMC stated that it viewed the Initial Decision as
establishing two general principles to guide deliberation on the lawful-
ness of minibridge-type operations. First, certain cargo may be tribu-
tary to a port, but any "naturally tributary zone" around a port is
constantly changing, varying with time and with the nature of the com-
modity shipped.' 52 To determine whether the cargo is naturally tribu-
tary, four factors are to be considered: the flow of traffic through the
port prior to the conduct questioned, relevant inland transport rates,
natural or geographic transport patterns, and shippers' needs and cargo
characteristics. 5
3
The second general principle is that, should the cargo be found to
be naturally tributary to a port, a carrier or port may not unreasonably
divert that cargo. Thus, the Commission adopted the Initial Decision's
two-step analysis. First, the cargo must be proven to be naturally tribu-
tary; then the unreasonableness of the diversionary practice must be
shown. The Far East case identified five factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the practice: the quantity and quali-
ty of cargo being diverted; the cost to the carrier providing direct serv-
ice to the port; operational difficulties or other transport factors;
competitive conditions existing at the time; and the fairness of the
methods employed by the diversionary scheme.'54
The Far East case promulgated principles that greatly widened the
scope of the inquiry into allegations of cargo diversion. The inquiry as
formulated provides for consideration of all factors relevant to the
challenged practice which, in turn, enable the Commission and the
courts to undertake a broader balancing of the equities of ports, ship-
pers, carriers and consumers.
Implicit in the Far East decision is the rejection of earlier prece-
dent such as SA1CL and Reduced Rates to Puerto Rico insofar as they
articulated notions of naturally tributary cargo. Interestingly, the Far
East case stated that its guidelines would be applied to all future pro-
ceedings in which discrimination or diversion is alleged. Thus, the
FMC will make no distinction in principle among intermodal cases,
innovation cases and cases presenting more traditional microeconomic
problems of port discrimination.
It is clear from Far East that the protected area that may be
plainants asserted that the Initial Decision had placed "impossible" burdens on the complaining
ports by requiring an extensive inquiry into patterns of trade in order to define naturally tributary
cargo. Id. at 17.
152. Final Decision, slip op. at 7.
153. Id. at 7-8.
154. Id. at 8.
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claimed by a port as local or naturally tributary will be narrowed. Fur-
thermore, the burden upon a challenger of a diversion scheme is in-
creased. The challenger must now first meet the burden of proof that
cargo is tributary and then must prove that its diversion is unreasona-
ble. Such a requirement greatly widens the scope of the proceeding
and decreases the likelihood that the challenge will be successful.
While the widened scope of inquiry into all relevant factors provides
the FMC with a more realistic model by which to decide these ques-
tions, the increased difficulty of a challenge will act to some degree as a
deterrent to potential litigants.
Clearly, as the development of intermodal transport continues,
past patterns of trade and the decisions concerning past practices are of
limited value in testing the lawfulness of these innovative systems. The
traditional concept of naturally tributary areas has been revised to re-
main a useful means of protecting port interests. Rather than being
viewed as a concept to be invoked as a protective fence around an area,
it must be seen as an element of a community of interests including
those of the shipper, carrier and the consuming public, all of which
must be considered in determining the impact of the innovation on the
entire community. As such, the inquiry must be broadly based, taking
into account all relevant evidence useful in obtaining an equitable reso-
lution of conflicting interests between the parties. Used in this way, the
naturally tributary concept may provide a focus for an inquiry into the
total impact of the challenged intermodal system.
III. CONCLUSION
The traditional view of both the ICC and the FMC that they
lacked authority to coordinate their jurisdiction has given way to a new
willingness to coordinate in order to permit the creation of minibridge
and land-bridge systems. This coordination has been accomplished
without an expansion of either agency's statutory jurisdiction. Instead,
the language of the present jurisdictional statutes has been broadly con-
strued by the agencies and the courts to permit this innovative response
to changing transport technology. Thus, disadvantaged port interests
are unlikely to be able to challenge successfully the minibridge or land-
bridge schemes on the grounds that the agencies lack the power to co-
ordinate their jurisdiction.
In like manner, the FMC has redefined its cause of action designed
to protect naturally tributary cargo. By seeking to balance the interests
of shipper, carrier, port and consumer, the FMC has deflated "natu-
rally tributary cargo" to that which is merely "local" to the port. At the
same time, the inquiry has been broadened to include a consideration
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of all relevant factors. As a result, the litigant seeking to defeat a tech-
nologically innovative system through a cargo-diversion challenge
must bear a heavier burden of proof, and the factual inquiry will oper-
ate on a much broadened scale. Such a balanced inquiry promises
greater efficiency to the shipper and consumer and threatens the chal-
lenger with a lessened likelihood of success as well as greater costs of
proof.
Fred Thompson III
